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Consolidated Planning Boards: Valid and
Valuable-A Reply to Albert Pirro
Philip Weinberg*
Will Rogers reportedly once said, "land ... they make so
little of it nowadays." We in New York have to use wisely what
we have. And consolidated planning boards, encouraging local
governments to cooperate in land-use concerns, are a major step
forward in accomplishing this.'
It is ironic that Albert J. Pirro, Jr., a highly respected land
use lawyer, commences his attack on the constitutionality of
consolidated planning boards 2 with a quote from McCulloch v.
Maryland.3 That landmark decision by Chief Justice John Mar-
shall sustained a broad reading of governmental power, holding
that "a government, entrusted with... ample powers,.. . must
also be entrusted with ample means for their execution."4 And
that, ultimately, is at the root of why the courts are likely to
uphold the validity of consolidated planning boards.
In enacting the statutes Mr. Pirro contends are invalid, the
Legislature made clear its intent that municipal governments
should have "express statutory authority... to enter into agree-
ments to undertake comprehensive planning and land use regu-
lation," to foster "more efficient use of infrastructure and
municipal revenues, as well as the enhanced protection of com-
munity resources, especially where such resources span munici-
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; Columbia Law
School, 1958. The author teaches Constitutional Law and Environmental Law and
is author of the Practice Commentary to McKinney's New York Environmental
Conservation Law as well as a casebook, Environmental Law: Cases and Materials
(Austin & Winfield 1994). The author is indebted to Deana Giancarlo (St. John's
1997) for research assistance in preparing this article.
1. See N.Y. GEN. CrrY LAw § 20-g (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.Y. ToWN LAW
§ 284 (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741 (McKinney 1996).
2. See Albert J. Pirro, Jr., The Unconstitutionality of Consolidated Planning
Boards: Interlocal Planning Under New York Law, 16 PACE L. REv. 477 (1996).
3. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
4. Id. at 408.
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pal boundaries." It is surely late in the day to claim the
Legislature lacked authority under its police power-"the least
limitable of all the powers of government"6-to take this step.
And, it should be noted, the statutes under attack did no more
than reaffirm a power that municipalities have long had to co-
operate voluntarily in planning.7
This legislation stemmed from a thorough statewide study
by the State Joint Legislative Commission on Rural Resources.
The Commission held conferences and public hearings at which
"[plarticipants repeatedly stressed the inability of many small
local governments acting individually to protect and enhance
their communities through comprehensive planning and land
use regulation and development or to protect community and
natural resources that span municipal boundaries."8 Its legisla-
tive sponsor noted that the statute "provided a basic structure
for initiating cooperative zoning and planning efforts, while pre-
serving maximum flexibility for local governments to develop
specific local approaches to coordination and joint service deliv-
ery."9 The sponsor expressly pointed to the "concern over the
fragmentation and relative isolation of land use decisions made
by individual local governments"' 0-a concern repeatedly voiced
as municipalities in New York continue to determine land-use
issues, such as traffic and water supply, with impacts far be-
yond their borders. The Department of State, in supporting the
legislation, likewise noted that "the measure recognizes that
community and natural resources often involve several munici-
palities, [which] should be encouraged to develop joint plans to
5. N.Y. GEN CiTY LAw § 20-g(1) (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.Y. TowN LAW
§ 284(1) (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741(1) (McKinney 1996).
6. Engelsher v. Jacobs, 5 N.Y.2d 370, 373, 157 N.E.2d 626, 627, 184 N.Y.S.2d
640, 642, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959).
7. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw §§ 119-m to 119-oo (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1997)
(authorizing municipal cooperation in planning and other activities); N.Y. GEN.
M N. LAw § 239-n (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1997) (authorizing local governments
to create intergovernmental relations councils for, inter alia, "intercommunity
planning").
8. Memorandum of Assem. William Magee, reprinted in (19921 N.Y. LEOis.
ANN. 454. See also John R. Nolon, Comprehensive Land- Use Planning: Learning
How and Where to Grow, 13 PACE L. REV. 351 (1993).
9. Magee, supra note 8, at 454-55.
10. Letter of Assem. William Magee to Counsel to Gov., July 23, 1992 (N.Y.S.
7181-A, N.Y.A. 9805-A, 215th Sess.) (Legis. Bill Jacket at 5).
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address preservation and development."" The New York State
Conference of Mayors and Municipal Officials supported the
legislation since it "benefits municipalities, developers, and the
resident[s] of cities [across] the State."12 Similarly, the Associa-
tion of Towns of the State of New York noted that the legisla-
tion furnishes "opportunities for cooperation" that "may result
in important savings and economies in the operation of local
government."' 3
The Court of Appeals has recognized the need for land-use
planning and regulation at a broader level than that of individ-
ual local governments. In its landmark decision in Golden v.
Town of Ramapo,14 the court noted:
Undoubtedly, current zoning enabling legislation is burdened by
the largely antiquated notion which deigns that the regulation of
land use and development is uniquely a function of local govern-
ment-that the public interest of the State is exhausted once its
political subdivisions have been delegated the authority to zone.
While such jurisdictional allocations may well have been consis-
tent with formerly prevailing conditions and assumptions, ques-
tions of broader public interest have commonly been ignored.15
The court urged that "[s]tate-wide or regional control of
planning would insure that interests broader than that of the
municipality underlie various land use policies."' 6 This legisla-
tion constitutes a significant step toward that goal.
The Equal Protection Claim
The suggestion that a consolidated planning board violates
the one person, one vote principle because it "divests the power
11. Memorandum of Dept. of State to Counsel to Gov., July 7, 1992 (N.Y.A.
9805-A, 215th Sess.) (Legis. Bill Jacket at 10, 11).
12. Letter of Edward C. Farrell, Exec. Dir., N.Y.S. Conf. of Mayors and Munic-
ipal Officials to Counsel to Gov., June 30, 1992 (N.YA. 9805-A, 215th Sess.)
(Legis. Bill Jacket at 12).
13. Letter of G. Jeffrey Haber, Exec. Sec., Ass'n of Towns of the State of New
York, June 30, 1992 (N.Y.A. 9805-A. 215th Sess.) (Legis. Bill Jacket at 20). The
State Legislative Commission on Rural Resources also favored the bill. See id. at
14.
14. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1003 (1972).
15. Id. at 374, 285 N.E.2d at 299, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 148-49 (citations omitted).
16. Id. at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
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each autonomous municipality enjoys"1 7 is mistaken. Municipal
governments are creatures of the State and not "persons" who
may assert rights under the Fourteenth Amendment."" As for
the rights of their citizens, the author himself notes that the one
person, one vote rule does not apply to appointed officers' 9-nor
could it, since no vote of citizens is involved. Instead, he argues,
equal protection is denied where officials of one town may affect
land use in another.2 0 But the courts have consistently upheld
provisions for consolidated government decision-making as
against one person, one vote claims. In Sailors v. Board of Edu-
cation2' the Supreme Court sustained the appointment of
county school board members where each local school board
named a delegate who voted for the county school board's mem-
bers.22 The county school board set policy for boards within the
county, just as consolidated planning boards plan for the entire
area. In language apt here, the Court noted, "[v]iable local gov-
ernments may need many innovations, numerous combinations
of old and new devices, great flexibility in municipal arrange-
ments to meet changing urban conditions. We see nothing in
the Constitution to prevent experimentation."23
Even more on point is Education lInstruccion, Inc. v.
Moore,24 rejecting a one person, one vote contention as inappli-
cable to Connecticut's Capitol Regional Council of Govern-
ments, an agency consisting of the chief elected officers of towns
in the Hartford area, empowered to draft development plans
and propose (though not adopt) zoning changes. 25
17. Pirro, supra note 2, at 482.
18. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907); South Macomb
Disposal Auth. v. Washington Township, 790 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1986).
19. See Pirro, supra note 2, at 484 n.35 (citing Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387
U.S. 105 (1967)).
20. See Pirro, supra note 2, at 484 n.35.
21. 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
22. See id.
23. Id. at 110-11. Indeed, the Supreme Court has gone so far as to sustain a
state law authorizing cities to exercise their police and sanitary jurisdiction over
persons residing up to three miles beyond the city's borders, rejecting a one person,
one vote claim. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
24. 379 F. Supp. 1160 (D. Conn. 1973), affd, 503 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1109 (1975).
25. See id.
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The author relies heavily on Board of Estimate v. Morris,26
in which the Supreme Court ruled the former Board of Estimate
of the City of New York had run afoul of the one person, one
vote rule.27 But the Board of Estimate consisted of elected (not
appointed) officials under a scheme giving the Borough Presi-
dent of Staten Island a vote equal to that of the Borough Presi-
dent of Queens,2 though Queens has four times Staten Island's
population. 29 And the Board served as a virtual upper house of
the City's legislature, with power over not just zoning but prop-
erty taxes and the voting of the City's capital and expense budg-
ets.30 These differences render Morris totally distinguishable.
In any event the one person, one vote decisions turn on the
fact that voting is deemed a fundamental right under the Con-
stitution, so that laws restricting the vote are subject to strict
scrutiny.31 Nothing of that sort is involved here.
The further argument that consolidated planning boards
violate equal protection 2 because of the New York Constitu-
tion's provision that local government officers be "elected by the
people of the local government"3 is inaccurate since joint plan-
ning board members are not town officers within the meaning of
that provision. Town planning board members are likewise not
elected in New York.34 In any event the very next clause of the
Constitution states that "l]ocal governments shall have the
power to agree, as authorized by act of the legislature, with...
other governments within or without the State, to provide coop-
eratively, jointly or by contract any . . . service, activity or un-
dertaking ... ."35 Finally, a violation of the State Constitution's
home-rule provisions,36 even were it shown, would not translate
into a denial of equal protection.
26. 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
27. See id.
28. See id. at 694.
29. See id. at 700 n.7.
30. See id. at 694-96.
31. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
32. See Pirro, supra note 2, at 487.
33. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1, cl. b, quoted in Pirro, supra note 2, at 488.
34. See N.Y. TowN LAw § 20 (McKinney 1987).
35. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1, cl. c.
36. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
1997] 383
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Due Process
The author's due process contentions 37 amount to an at-
tempt to find a denial of substantive due process in statutes reg-
ulating economic concerns-a trail the courts have rejected
consistently for decades. Substantive due process claims are
subject to a strong presumption of constitutionality, and "the
burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to estab-
lish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational
way."38 In New York one must prove the unconstitutionality of
such a statute "beyond a reasonable doubt."39
The suggestion that consolidated planning boards deny due
process because they violate home rule is puzzling.40 A viola-
tion of New York's home-rule provisions41 does not equal a de-
nial of due process. And it is difficult to discern any home-rule
violation on the part of a statute specifically authorized, as
noted earlier, by the Constitution's grant of power to local gov-
ernments to agree with other local governments to provide
jointly, if they so choose, for any "service, activity or undertak-
ing . *."..42
The Legislature has determined that cooperative planning
is a matter of State concern, by expressly providing that "[bly
the enactment of this section the legislature seeks to promote
intergovernmental cooperation [for] comprehensive planning
and land use regulation. . . "43 Under basic principles, legisla-
tion on an issue found to be of state concern does not violate
37. See Pirro, supra note 2, at 489-501.
38. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83
(1978) (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
39. A.E. Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 182, 193, 264 N.E.2d 118, 123,
315 N.Y.S.2d 625, 633 (1970), appeal dismissed sub nom., Reptile Products Ass'n v.
Diamond, 401 U.S. 969 (1971).
40. See Pirro, supra note 2, at 490-94.
41. See generally N.Y. MUN. HOME RuLE LAw §§ 1-59 (McKinney 1994 &
Supp. 1997).
42. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1, cl. c. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
43. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAw § 20-g(1) (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.Y. TowN LAW
§ 284(1) (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 7-741(1) (McKinney 1996).
One expert in land-use law has pointed to added benefits of consolidated planning
boards, including cost savings through shared enforcement and use of consultants,
joint training for staff, and added opportunities for economic development. See
PATRICIA E. SALKIN, INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION IN LAND USE PLANNING, Gov-
ERNMENT LAw CTR. OF ALBANY LAW SCH. (1994).
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New York's home-rule provisions. The courts have so held with
regard to State regulation of docks and wharves on Lake
George, "even when the legislation has a '.. . direct effect on the
most basic of local interests . .. .'"44 Likewise, state legislation
controlling solid waste disposal on Long Island is of state con-
cern even though it bars landfills on town property.45
It is beyond dispute that land-use planning is such an issue
of state concern, as Mr. Pirro acknowledges in referring to
Golden v. Town of Ramapo.46 The lack of state legislation de-
cried by the Court of Appeals in Golden over two decades ago
has now been partially cured. Other states such as Vermont, 47
Maine48 and Hawaii 49 have gone further and enacted statewide
land-use controls. It is anachronistic to contend that home rule
prevents the Legislature from authorizing towns to cooperate in
this area, especially when other states have enacted controls at
the state level. The statutes challenged here amount to a recog-
nition that localities are often interdependent, with develop-
ment in one town affecting the traffic, water supply and the like
of its neighbors, and some localities luring major developments
to augment their tax base while others shun it on equally paro-
chial grounds, despite the impacts on other communities. Just
as Clemenceau observed that war is too important to leave to
the generals, the Legislature is authorized to permit towns to
44. Salvador v. State, 205 A.D.2d 194, 199, 618 N.Y.S.2d 142, 144 (3d Dep't
1994), appeal dismissed, 85 N.Y.2d 857, 648 N.E.2d 795, 624 N.Y.S.2d 375, leave to
appeal denied, 85 N.Y.2d 810, 653 N.E.2d 620, 629 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1995) (citing In
re Town of Islip v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 50, 57, 473 N.E.2d 756, 760, 484 N.Y.S.2d
528, 532 (1984), quoting In re Board of Educ. v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 535,
542, 362 N.E.2d 948, 954, 394 N.Y.S.2d 148, 154 (1977)).
45. See In re Town of Islip, 64 N.Y.2d at 56-57, 473 N.E.2d at 760, 484
N.Y.S.2d at 532. See also Albany Area Builders Ass'n v. Town of Guilderland, 74
N.Y.2d 372, 546 N.E.2d 920, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1989) (state law preempts town
impact fee charging developers for road improvements).
46. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627, appeal dismissed, 409
U.S. 1003 (1972). See supra text accompanying notes 14-16. See Pirro, supra note
2, at 490-91.
47. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 4341-4351 (1992) (regional planning boards);
tit. 10, §§ 6001-6008 (1993 & Supp. 1995) (state planning boards). See Southview
Assoc., Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 987
(1993) (upholding VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001-6008 (1984 & Supp. 1991)).
48. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, §§ 2321-2342 (West 1996).
49. See HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 205-1 to 205-18 (1993 & Supp. 1995).
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band together and not leave land-use decisions exclusively to
each town.
People ex rel. Town of Pelham v. Village of Pelham,50 on
which the author relies,51 was a 1915 decision overturning a
state law authorizing each town in Westchester County to as-
sess property within villages in those towns, and collect taxes
on that property.52 The Court of Appeals ruled this law "strips
the local village officials of every vestige of authority which they
formerly possessed in this regard, except the right to fix and
determine the amount of the annual tax."53 This was "an inva-
sion of the local rights of the village.. . in direct violation of the
home rule provision of the Constitution."54 Unlike the laws at
issue here, the statute in Pelham had not the slightest justifica-
tion as a matter of statewide concern. Pelham has been limited
to its unusual facts by later cases. It has been held not to apply
to a tax for a park district encompassing a village and other
areas.
55
The Court of Appeals has consistently made it clear that in
"enacting a zoning ordinance, consideration must be given to re-
gional needs and requirements."56 In the recent Long Island
Pine Barrens Society, Inc. v. Planning Board of Town of Brook-
haven,57 that court strongly urged regional planning to protect
Long Island's aquifer and water supply, as a matter of "urgent
public concern," and chided the Legislature for its failure to
act.58 The Legislature responded by adopting the Long Island
Pine Barrens Protection Act, establishing a commission com-
prised of a State representative, the Suffolk County Executive
and the supervisors of the three involved towns.59 This regional
body is empowered to draft a land-use plan governing the pine
barrens region, essential to the aquifer, which straddles the
50. 215 N.Y. 374, 109 N.E. 513 (1915).
51. See Pirro, supra note 2, at 493.
52. See Town of Pelham, 215 N.Y. at 388-89, 109 N.E. at 517.
53. Id. at 388, 517.
54. Id.
55. See Village of Kensington v. Town of North Hempstead, 236 A.D. 340, 258
N.Y.S. 355 (2d Dep't 1932), affd, 261 N.Y. 260, 185 N.E. 94 (1933).
56. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 111, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242,
378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 681 (1975).
57. 80 N.Y.2d 500, 606 N.E.2d 1373, 591 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1992).
58. Id. at 517-18, 606 N.E.2d at 1381, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 990.
59. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 57-0119(2) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
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three towns.60 The plan must be adopted by unanimous vote,
and has recently been so adopted.6 1
Numerous similar examples of regional land-use planning
fostered by State statute exist-the Adirondack Park Agency, 62
the Tug Hill Commission with its consolidated planning
board,63 the Hudson River Valley Greenway,6 New Jersey's
Pinelands Protection Act,65 and many others. Vermont has
adopted statewide land-use controls for large-scale develop-
ment,66 as have Maine67 and Hawaii.68 The Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency actually crosses state boundaries to control
land use and development around Lake Tahoe, which straddles
California and Nevada. 69 The need for comprehensive planning
and land-use decision-making is so patent and well-docu-
mented70 that there can be no serious issue as to its validity and
no plausible claim that it interferes with home rule.
Delegation of Power
The author next argues that these statutes unconstitution-
ally delegate zoning authority.71 In fact these enactments con-
tain guidehnes-"to undertake comprehensive planning and
land use regulation," to further "enhanced protection of commu-
60. See id. § 57-0121 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
61. See id. § 57-0121(12). See also L.I. Pine Barrens Becomes 3d State Pre-
serve, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1995, at B5.
62. See N.Y. ExEc. LAw §§ 801-820 (McKinney 1996).
63. See Benjamin P. Coe, Tug Hill, New York Progress Through Cooperation
in a Rural Region, NATIONAL Crvic REv. 449 (Fall-Winter 1992). The Tug Hill
Commission was created by the state legislature in 1972. Act of June 8, 1972, ch.
972, 1972 N.Y. Laws 3872.
64. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 44-0101 to 44-0121 (McKinney Supp.
1997).
65. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:18A-1 to 13:18A-49 (West 1991).
66. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6008 (1993 & Supp. 1996).
67. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, §§ 2321-2342 (West 1996).
68. See HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 205-1 to 205-37 (1993 & Supp. 1995).
69. See CAIF. GOV'T CODE §§ 66800-66801 (West 1983 & Supp. 1997); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 277.190-277.220 (1995).
70. See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin, Regional Planning in New York State: A State
Rich in National Models, Yet Weak in Overall Statewide Planning Coordination,
13 PACE L. REV. 505, 509 (1993) (citing recommendations for regional and state-
wide land-use planning as long ago as the administration of Gov. Franklin D.
Roosevelt). See also Nolon, supra note 8.
71. See Pirro, supra note 2, at 494.
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nity resources,"72-similar to those in the statutes enabling mu-
nicipalities to zone. 73 It has been many decades since the courts
have set aside police-power enactments on the basis of improper
delegation to an administrative agency. The modern view is
that the Legislature may "direct that an administrative officer
... have ample latitude within which... to ascertain the condi-
tions which [the Legislature] has made prerequisite to the oper-
ation of its ... command." 74
The statutes authorizing intermunicipal agreements as to
planning and land use plainly contemplate that consolidated
planning boards "may replace individual planning boards."75 In
other words, they may assume the powers local planning boards
have, and no more. Consolidated boards enjoy the authority
given municipal planning boards in other provisions of the
law.76 They do not somehow absorb the sort of unlimited pow-
ers the author fears.
Finally, Mr. Pirro suggests that the legislation he questions
does not relate to health, safety or welfare. 77 But that, of
course, is what zoning, planning and land-use controls are all
about. Such statutes have been consistently sustained as valid
exercises of the police power ever since Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co. in 1926.78 The venue for objections to the suita-
bility or wisdom of joint planning boards is the Legislature, not
the courts. Many years ago, in turning its back on archaic no-
tions of due process such as those urged in this attack, the
Supreme Court held:
72. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20-g(1) (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.Y. TowN LAw
§ 284(1) (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 7-741() (McKinney 1996).
73. See N.Y. GEN. CrrY LAw §§ 20(24), (25) (McKinney 1989); N.Y. TowN LAw
§ 261 (McKinney 1987); N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 7-700 (McKinney 1996).
74. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944). See also Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 221-22 n.7 (1986) ("the delegation of
discretionary authority was a reasonable means of achieving congressional aims");
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 49 (1966).
75. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAw § 20-g(4)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.Y. TowN LAw
§ 284(4)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-741(4)(a) (McKinney
1996).
76. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. CrrY LAw § 27 (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.Y. ToWN
LAw § 271 (McKinney Supp. 1987); N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 7-718 (McKinney 1996).
77. See Pirro, supra note 2, at 498-502.
78. 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
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Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is
up to the legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and
utility of legislation. There was a time when the Due Process
Clause was used by this Court to strike down laws which were
thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with some
particular economic or social philosophy.
The doctrine ... that due process authorizes courts to hold laws
unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted un-
wisely-has long since been discarded. We have returned to the
original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute
their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of the legisla-
tive bodies, who are elected to pass laws. 79
De Facto Taking
The author's final objection, that these laws amount to a de
facto taking,80 is premature at best. Such a taking occurs only
when a land-use regulation deprives the owner of all reasonable
investment-backed expectations.8 ' Mere reduction in the value
of a parcel does not constitute a taking.8 2 The prospect that a
law might, if improperly applied, deny a landowner all reason-
able value does not entitle him or her to challenge it facially.8 3
Therefore the claim that these statutes "may create a de
facto building moratorium because municipalities are author-
ized to create another layer of planning review"8 4 is speculative.
As noted earlier, the statutes do no more than codify the right
municipalities already had to plan cooperatively.8 5 There is
scant basis for assuming that joint planning would lead to the
reflexive disapproval of development. And the disapproval of a
particular proposal would be judicially reviewable whether done
by a single town or a consolidated planning board.
79. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963).
80. See Pirro, supra note 2, at 502.
81. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
82. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
83. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126
(1985); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 294
(1981).
84. Pirro, supra note 2, at 504.
85. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Finally, most disapprovals of development plans are not de
facto takings in any event. Even a disapproval that a court
overturned as arbitrary and capricious would only amount to a
taking of property were it to deny the owner of all reasonable
investment-backed expectations-a rare occurrence, which the
landowner must prove on the facts of the individual case.8 6
Conclusion
The Legislature has simply recognized that land-use issues
often transcend the borders of individual localities, and has
codified the right that municipalities have historically had to
cooperate in planning and controlling development should they
see fit. The varied objections voiced against consolidated boards
are unlikely to succeed. Legislation of this nature enjoys a pow-
erful presumption of constitutionality, and the New York courts
have consistently made clear the need for planning and land-
use regulation at a regional level. Areas that protect their envi-
ronment from sprawl and uncontrolled development are not just
more attractive places to live and work; they tend to enjoy
greater economic prosperity as well. Legislation that furthers
these interrelated goals is welcome, and will likely be embraced,
not overturned, by the courts.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
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